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I. INTRODUCTION
In Deal or No Deal: Reinterpreting the FCC's Ownership Rules for a
Fair Game,1 Cindy J. Cho concludes that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) ought to apply a standard of reciprocity to initial and
renewal applications for broadcast licenses by foreign-owned companies in
order to deal with the anticompetitive conduct of foreign broadcasters in
the U.S. market. 2 This conclusion is premised on a fundamental
* Ms. Sherman was the chief lawyer for the U.S. delegation to the WTO basic
telecommunications negotiations from 1994 to 1997, while at the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. She is now in private practice.
1. Cindy J. Cho, Note, Deal or No Deal: Reinterpreting the FCC's Foreign
Ownership Rules for a Fair Game, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 111 (2008).
2. Id. at 134.
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misunderstanding of U.S. trade commitments and the FCC's
implementation of those commitments. The market-opening U.S. trade
commitments and FCC orders that Ms. Cho discusses do not apply to
broadcasting services or broadcast licenses. In fact, nothing in current U.S.
trade commitments or FCC orders precludes application of a reciprocity
test to applications from non-U.S. companies for a broadcast license. This
Article attempts to set the record straight.
II. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 310
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, 3 as originally
enacted and as modified over time, imposes specific ownership restrictions
on who may hold certain types of radio licenses, including: (i) broadcast,
(ii) common carrier, and (iii) aeronautical en route and aeronautical fixed
radio station licenses.4 Prior to 1934, § 310 contained a flat prohibition on
the award of these three types of licenses to foreign individuals, foreign
governments, foreign companies, and U.S. companies which are more than
twenty-percent owned by foreign individuals, foreign governments, or
foreign companies.
In 1934, § 310 was amended to give the FCC some discretion in
allowing up to one hundred percent foreign indirect ownership. ' The
revised § 310(b)(4) gives the FCC discretion to allow up to one hundred
percent foreign ownership in broadcast and common carrier radio licensees,
through a U.S. parent company that has a controlling interest in the
licensee. Section 310(b)(4) provides that a company cannot receive a
broadcast or common carrier radio license if the company is directly or
indirectly controlled by any corporation of which more than twenty-five
percent of the capital stock is owned by foreign individuals, foreign
governments, and foreign companies, if the FCC determines that the public
interest will be served by refusal or revocation of such a license.6 Thus,
under § 31 0(b)(4), the statutory presumption has always been that foreign
ownership of a broadcast or common carrier licensee in excess of twenty-
five percent is permissible in the absence of an FCC finding to the contrary.
In practice, the FCC has exercised its discretion "sparingly," presuming
that the twenty-five percent holding company limit should not be waived
3. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
4. While 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) also applies to aeronautical licenses, this Article is
limited to a discussion of broadcast and common carrier licenses.
5. Act of Jan. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-505, § 2, 88 Stat. 1576, 1576 (1974)
(amending the Communications Act of 1934 permitting the FCC to grant radio station
licenses directly to aliens).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).
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unless the potential investor can demonstrate that the public interest will
not be harmed.7
Ms. Cho suggests that the FCC's interpretation of § 310 changed in
the 1990s, prompted by the 1996 Act, from a focus on national security to
economic interests.8 There was definitely a change in the FCC's approach
to foreign ownership in the mid-1990s, but only with respect to common
carrier licenses. The FCC's policy on foreign ownership of broadcast
licenses did not change. As will be described below, the U.S. trade
commitments and the orders that Ms. Cho refers to as evidence of new
FCC policies with respect to foreign ownership of broadcast licenses, in
fact, are limited in scope to international § 214 authorizations, 9 cable
landing licenses, and authorizations to exceed the twenty-five percent
foreign ownership benchmark in section § 310(b)(4) for common carrier
radio licenses.' °
III. U.S. TRADE COMMITMENTS
Ms. Cho refers to U.S. obligations under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), obligations in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and other telecommunications agreements with Mexico as
supporting the FCC's change in policy toward foreign ownership of
broadcast licenses." None of these agreements obligate the United States to
allow foreign ownership of broadcast licenses. To the contrary, both the
NAFTA and WTO commitments preserve the United States' ability to
prohibit foreign ownership of broadcast licenses, and the
telecommunications agreements that Ms. Cho refers to do not deal with
broadcast licenses at all.
7. Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 3873, para. 183 (1996) [hereinafter Foreign Carrier Entry Order]; James G. Ennis
& David N. Roberts, Foreign Ownership in U.S. Communications Industry: The Impact of
Section 310, 19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 243, 245 (1991).
8. Cho, supra note 1, at 177. Ms. Cho says that the 1996 Act did not change the
foreign ownership provisions, but this is not correct. The 1996 Act removed the flat
prohibition in § 31 0(b)(3) on granting a broadcast, common carrier or aeronautical license to
U.S. companies with any non-U.S. nationals as an officer or director and the discretionary
prohibition in § 310(b)(4) on granting such licenses to companies with any non-national
U.S. officer or non-U.S. nationals comprising more than twenty-five percent of the board of
directors.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (concerning authorization of common carrier facilities and
services).
10. Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomms. Market, Report
and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23891, para. 14 (1997) [hereinafter
Foreign Participation Order].
11. Cho, supra note 1, at 119, 129.
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IV. NAFTA COMMITMENTS
NAFTA 12 is one of the first trade agreements to include trade in
services.13 Chapter Eleven establishes obligations relating to investments,
which are broadly defined to include branches, subsidiaries, and joint
ventures of companies and individuals of one NAFTA party in the territory
of another, regardless of the business to be conducted. 14 The NAFTA
parties agreed to national treatment for investors of the other NAFTA
parties and their investments. This requires each NAFTA party to treat
NAFTA investors and their investments "no less favorabl[y] than it
accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors [and their investments]
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."' 5 This
national treatment obligation would cover the ability to obtain licenses
from the FCC to provide telecommunications or broadcasting services in
the United States.
Chapter Twelve deals with cross-border provision of services,
requiring each NAFTA party to provide national treatment to services
provided from the territory of one NAFTA party into the territory of
another. 16 Again, this nondiscrimination requirement applies to FCC
licensing, such as the grant of § 214 licenses.
Chapters Eleven and Twelve each provide that a NAFTA party can
exempt certain laws and regulations that do not conform to the national
treatment and other obligations contained in the relevant Chapter.' 7 Laws
and regulations which are listed as a reservation in the annexes to NAFTA
are exempt from challenge by other NAFTA parties, and they allow a
NAFTA party to maintain those existing or adopt new laws and regulations
that vary from the nondiscrimination rules.1 8 The United States took such a
reservation for telecommunications and broadcasting services, specifically
referencing § 310(a) and (b) as existing, nonconforming measures.19
12. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
13. The first trade agreement to include services was the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, which was concluded in 1988 and was subsumed by NAFTA when that
agreement entered into force. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT,
IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING
STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 457 (1993) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION].
14. NAFTA, supra note 12, at Article 1139.
15. Id. at Article 1102 (1)-(2).
16. Id. at Article 1202.
17. See id. at Articles 1108, 1206.
18. STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 13, at 602-03.
19. NAFTA, supra note 12, at Annex II.
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Ms. Cho refers specifically to Annex VI of NAFTA as evidence of "a
level of cooperative reciprocity."' 20 Article 1208 of NAFTA creates a
mechanism in Annex VI for the NAFTA parties to record commitments to
eliminate or phase out discriminatory restrictions that create barriers to
cross-border services. In Annex VI, the United States agreed to treat
Canadian and Mexican broadcast stations similar to U.S. broadcast stations
when deciding whether to grant authority under § 325 of the
Communications Act to transmit programming to Mexican or Canadian
stations for retransmission into the United States. For example, § 325
applies in cases where a U.S. station near the United States-Mexico border
transmits its local news and weather to a Mexican station on the other side
of the border and the Mexican station rebroadcasts that programming.22
Taken together, nothing in NAFTA changed U.S. law or FCC policy with
respect to foreign ownership of telecommunications or broadcast licenses.
V. OTHER TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENTS
The other telecommunications agreements referred to by Ms. Cho did
not cause changes in FCC policy with respect to foreign ownership. Since
at least the 1950s, the United States has entered into a series of agreements
with Mexico and Canada on the allocation and operation of radio
frequencies along their respective borders. These agreements apply to
frequencies used for radio and TV broadcasting, satellite transmissions, and
other services using radio frequencies which are designed to prevent undue
interference between stations in the respective countries.2 3 While these
agreements certainly "address the importance of cooperation," as Ms. Cho
states, 24 they do not have anything to do with foreign ownership of
broadcast licenses.
20. Cho, supra note 1, at 129.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 325 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Metro Networks Comm., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20
F.C.C.R. 2474 (2005).
23. These agreements can be found at the FCC, International Bureau, International
Agreements, http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/agree (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). See Note No. 192
from John de Chastelain, Canadian Ambassador, to Warren M. Christopher, United States
Secretary of State, (Nov. 16, 1993) (attached to the Working Arrangement for Allotment
and Assignment of VHF and UHF Television Broadcasting Channels under the Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
relating to the TV Broadcasting Service (Mar. 1, 1989)), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/agree/files/can-bc/can-tv.pdf.
24. Cho, supra note 1, at 129.
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VI. WTO COMMITMENTS
The WTO was created in 1995 as a result of multilateral trade
negotiations, commonly referred to as the Uruguay Round.25 In joining the
WTO, a member undertakes commitments under a series of multilateral
trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).26 The GATS takes a different approach than NAFTA does on how
a WTO member undertakes commitments dealing with trade in services.
NAFTA assumes that a NAFTA party will provide national treatment and
market access to all services and service suppliers of the other NAFTA
parties in the absence of a reservation to the contrary. In contrast, WTO
members specifically negotiate national treatment and market access
commitments on a sector-by-sector basis. Unless a service is included in a
member's Schedule of Specific Commitments, the WTO member has no
obligation to provide national treatment or market access with respect to
that service or service suppliers of other WTO members.27
For purposes of this Article, there are two relevant market sectors-
telecommunications and audio-visual services. 28 Telecommunications
services are broken down into two major subgroups--"basic
telecommunications" and "value-added services" and within each
subgroup, services are further divided into market subsectors. Basic
telecommunications refers to telecommunications transport networks and
services, a9 such as fixed and mobile voice telephone services, fixed and
mobile data services, private leased circuit services, and satellite services.3°
Value-added telecommunications services are those in which suppliers
"add value" to the customer's information by enhancing its form or content
or by providing for its storage and retrieval, such as e-mail and voicemail. 31
25. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
26. Annex IB General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994 33 I.L.M. 1167.
[hereinafter GATS].
27. Id. at Article XX.
28. See World Trade Organization, Service Sectoral Classification List, Note by the
Secretariat, WTO, MTN.GNSJW/120, July 10, 1991 [hereinafter W120], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/mtngns_w-120e.doc. The GATS
classification scheme was based on a United Nations effort to classify services, referred to
as the Central Product Classification (Provisional). United Nations Statistics Division,
Central Product Classification Provisional, § 7, [hereinafter CPCProv], available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl--9&Lg-=l (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
29. Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, The Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 461 (GATT
Secretariat 1994), available at 1994 WL 761488, at *16-17.
30. World Trade Organization, Coverage of Basic Telecommunications and Value-
Added Services, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv-e/telecom_e/telecom-coverage_
e.htm#basic (last visited Feb. 4,2009).
31. Id.
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Audio-visual services are also broken down into subsectors, of which
only one is relevant-radio and television transmission services. "Radio
and television transmission services" refer to the network services
necessary for the transmission of radio and television signals.32
Each WTO member's Schedule lists the sectors for which the member
is willing to undertake market access obligations, i.e., whether a foreign
service may enter the market or whether a foreign service supplier may
supply a particular service.33 If a WTO member wishes to limit the number
of suppliers, the participation of foreign capital, or the form of investment,
it must include those limitations in its Schedule. The Schedule also lists
national treatment commitments by sector. Any limitations on national
treatment, such as foreign ownership limits, must be "scheduled" to be
effective.34
The U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments includes market access
and national treatment commitments in audio-visual services 35 and basic
telecommunications services.3 6 Under the subsector, "radio and television
transmission services," the United States inscribed the following limitation
on market access and national treatment:
Radio and television licences may not be held by: a foreign
government; a corporation chartered under the law of a foreign country
or which has a non-US citizen as an officer or director or more than 20
per cent of the capital stock of which is owned or voted by non-US
citizens; a corporation chartered under the laws of the United States
that is directly or indirectly controlled by a corporation more than 25
per cent of whose capital stock is owned by non-US citizens or a
32. W120 lists "radio and television transmission services" as corresponding to
CPCProv 7524, from which this description is taken. W120, supra note 28, at 4; CPCProv,
supra note 28, at § 7-524.
33. GATS, supra note 26, Article XVI.
34. Id. at Article XVII. Measures that are inconsistent with both market access and
national treatment are entered in the market access column and also provide a condition or
qualification to the national treatment commitment. Id. at Article XX(3).
35. U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/90 (Apr. 15, 1994) at 46-48,
[hereinafter U.S. Schedule 1994] available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GENviewer
window.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/SCHD/GATS-SC/SC90.WPF.
The audio-visual services commitments were made as part of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, which concluded in December 1993 and entered into force on January 1, 1995.
36. U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 2, GATS/SC/90/Suppl.2
(Apr. 11, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Schedule Supp. 2], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GENviewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocu
ments/t/SCHD/GATS-SC/SC90S2.WPF. The commitments in basic telecommunications
services were negotiated in a separate negotiation after the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round and entered into force on February 5, 1998. A detailed description of the negotiations
on basic telecommunications services and the results of those negotiations can be found in
Laura B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade
in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 61 (1998).
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foreign government or a corporation of which any officer or more than
25 per cent of the directors are non-US citizens. 37
Not only do the U.S. audio-visual commitments not change U.S. law,
they give the United States the ability to bar foreign ownership in broadcast
licenses. While § 310(b)(4) gives the FCC discretion to permit foreign
investment above twenty-five percent in a broadcast licensee's direct or
indirect controlling U.S. parent, the U.S. commitments categorically limit
foreign ownership of the parent to no more than twenty-five percent. In
addition, the U.S. Schedule also states that "US citizenship is required to
obtain radio and television licenses."
38
The United States took a very different approach in the negotiations
on basic telecommunications services. Negotiators aimed to achieve
maximum commitments from WTO members on market access and
national treatment, so as to promote the provision of telecommunications
services on a competitive basis. 39 In order to obtain market-opening
commitments from its trading partners, the United States had to make an
equally market-opening commitment.40 The major demand from its trading
partners was the elimination of the foreign ownership restrictions on
common carrier radio licenses.
Working with the FCC, the U.S. negotiating team crafted
commitments that took advantage of the discretion granted to the FCC in §
310(b)(4). As a result, the U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments 4'
prohibits direct ownership of a common carrier radio license by:
(a) foreign government or the representative thereof
(b) non-U.S. citizen or the representative of any non-U.S. citizen
(c) any corporation not organized under the laws of the United States
or
(d) U.S. corporation of which more than 20% of the capital stock is
owned or voted by a foreign government or its representative, non-U.S.
citizens or their representatives or a corporation not organized
under the laws of the United States.42
At the same time, the Schedule states that there are no market access
or national treatment limits on indirect ownership (through holding
companies) of a common carrier radio license. The United States preserves
37. U.S. Schedule 1994, supra note 35, at 48. Since the U.S. commitments on audio-
visual services were undertaken in 1993, prior to the passage of the 1996 Act, the limitation
mirrors the then-existing version of Section 310(b)(3) and (4), relating to nationality of
officers and directors.
38. Id.
39. Sherman, supra note 36, at 67 (citing GATS, Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications, Report of the Meeting of 6 May 1994, TS/NGBT/l, para. 5 (June 10,
1994)).
40. The information is based on the author's participation in the WTO negotiations.
41. U.S. Schedule Supp. 2, supra note 36.
42. Id.
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the right to discriminate in licensing satellite transmissions of direct-to-
home and direct-broadcast television services and digital audio radio
services in order to require reciprocity from trading partners with respect to
those services.43
VII. FCC IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. COMMITMENTS
Ms. Cho is correct that there was a fundamental policy shift at the
FCC in the mid-1990s in applying § 310, 44 but this shift only related to
telecommunications licenses and did not affect broadcast licenses. The shift
was not to downplay national security and put more emphasis on "public
interest," as Ms. Cho states. 45 Rather, it was to expand the reach of the
public interest test to address competition concerns about foreign entry into
the U.S. telecommunications market in addition to national security
concerns and uneasiness about competition in the U.S. market.
Starting with the Foreign Carrier Entry Order, the FCC looked to
"advance the public interest by promoting effective competition in the U.S.
telecommunications services market, particularly the market for
international services. ' 4 The FCC concerns were focused primarily on the
ability of foreign carriers with market power on the foreign end to unfairly
leverage their market power on the U.S. end. 47 To do so, the FCC
announced it would apply an "effective competitive opportunities" test to
"all planned investment in U.S. carriers by foreign carriers above a 25
percent equity threshold, or a controlling interest at any level."48 This
included applications for international § 214 authorizations, as well as
petitions for a declaratory ruling under § 3 10(b)(4).
In the case of § 214 applications, the FCC also looked at other public
interest factors, including the national security implications of the foreign
entry.49 With respect to foreign ownership under § 310(b)(4), the FCC
stated that it would look at "other public interest factors that weigh in favor
of, or against, foreign investment[]." 50 These additional factors include
"any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade concerns
raised by the Executive Branch.,
51
43. U.S. of Am., List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, Supplement 2,
GATS/EL/90/Suppl.2 (Apr. 11 1997), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/SCHD/GATS-SC/SC90S2.WPF.
44. Cho, supra note 1, at 117.
45. Id.
46. Foreign Carrier Entry Order, supra note 7, at para. 17.
47. Id. at para. 29.
48. Id at para. 19.
49. Id. at para. 56.
50. Id atpara. 216.
51. Id.
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Following the conclusion of the WTO negotiations on basic
telecommunications, the FCC reevaluated its competitive concerns about
foreign entry into the U.S. market for telecommunications services. It
concluded that these concerns had been alleviated by the market-opening
commitments of WTO members. 2 The Foreign Participation Order clearly
states that the new open entry policy for service suppliers from WTO
members applies to applications for international § 214 authorizations,
cable landing licenses, and authorization to exceed the § 3 10(b)(4) foreign
ownership benchmark.53 In parallel, the FCC extended the new open entry
policy to satellite services provided by foreign-owned satellite operators-
except for Direct-to-Home (DTH), Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
services, and digital audio radio services-which remain subject to the
effective competitive opportunities test in light of the U.S. exclusion of
these services from its WTO commitments. 4
The new open market entry policy was not a "critical blow to the
national security concern," as Ms. Cho states. 55 Both the Foreign
Participation Order and the Amendment to the Commission's Regulatory
Policies regarding domestic and international satellite services (DISCO II)
emphasize that the FCC will continue to look at all other facets of the
public interest test, including any national security, law enforcement,
foreign policy, and trade concerns raised by the Executive Branch. 6 In
practice, where foreign ownership is present, the FCC sends all
applications for § 214 authorizations, cable landing licenses, and all
petitions for a declaratory ruling under § 31 0(b)(4) to the Executive Branch
for review and does not act on the application or petition until the
Executive Branch responds. The Executive Branch often requests that the
FCC include, as a condition to a license or authorization, a requirement that
the licensee abide by any agreement reached with the Executive Branch to
assuage national security and law enforcement concerns, a request which
the FCC routinely grants. 7
52. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 10, at paras. 13-14.
53. Id.
54. Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed
Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Services in the United States,
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 24094, para. 13 (1997) [hereinafter DISCO I1].
55. Cho, supra note 1, at 119.
56. Foreign Participation Order, supra note 10, at para. 61; DISCO II, supra note 52,
at para. 178.
57. See, e.g., International Authorizations Granted, Public Notice, FCC DA No. 08-
1905 (Aug. 14, 2008) (granting a transfer of control application for Helio LLC, subject to
the condition that the transferee abide by the commitments made by Helio in a January 10,
2006 letter to the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Homeland Security).
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As demonstrated above, the FCC's policy toward foreign ownership
of broadcast licenses did not change in the Foreign Carrier Entry Order or
Foreign Participation Order. In the Foreign Carrier Entry Order, the FCC
specifically addressed the issue of whether an effective market access test
should apply in the broadcast context. The FCC stated that "[f]oreign
ownership of broadcast licenses presents different questions than for other
types of radio spectrum licenses.",58 Citing support from the Executive
Branch and Congress, the FCC concluded that, "the time has [not] yet
come to ease restrictions on alien ownership of broadcast licenses to the
extent that would result from the implementation of an effective
competitive opportunities test in the broadcast context." 59
Other FCC actions confirm that it has not changed its broadcast
policy. As evidenced by the title alone, the Foreign Ownership Guidelines
for FCC Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licenses,6° which Ms.
Cho cites as evidence that the FCC has an open entry policy for broadcast
licenses, 6' refers only to common carrier and aeronautical radio licenses.
Moreover, the text of the Foreign Ownership Guidelines states: "These
Guidelines are intended to apply to two categories of radio licenses: (1)
common carrier and (2) aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed
(hereinafter, 'aeronautical') licenses., 62
The other evidence that Ms. Cho cites to support her conclusion that
the FCC has changed its policy on broadcast licenses is not an FCC action
at all.63 It is a recommendation by a subcommittee of the FCC Advisory
Committee on Diversity.64 In fact, the FCC rejected the recommendation,
stating that: "[w]e are not convinced, on the basis of the record before us,
that taking the extraordinary step of relaxing our foreign ownership rules
would advance our interest in promoting diversification among broadcast
licensees, including women and minorities.' 6
5
58. Foreign Carrier Entry Order, supra note 7, at para. 192.
59. Id. at para. 194.
60. FCC INT'L BUREAU, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES FOR FCC COMMON CARRIER
AND AERONAUTICAL RADIO LICENSES (2004) [hereinafter FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.fcc.gov/ib/ForeignOwnership_Guidelines_Erratum.pdf.
61. Cho, supra note 1, at 117.
62. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP GUIDELINES, supra note 60, at 4.
63. Cho, supra note 1, at 133.
64. ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON DIVERSITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE,
RECOMMENDATION TO THE FCC: ADOPTION OF A DECLARATORY RULING ON SECTION
3 10(B)(4) WAIVERS (2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/041210/foreign
_ownershiprule.pdf.
65. Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Industry, Report and
Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922, para. 77
(2008).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The United States did not undertake any obligations to open the U.S.
market for radio or television broadcasting to foreign entry in either
NAFTA or the WTO. In fact, in both negotiations, the United States
preserved its ability to discriminate against foreign investors in the
broadcasting market. In contrast, the United States made significant
market-opening commitments for telecommunications services in the
WTO. This dichotomy between a closed market for broadcast services and
an open market for telecommunications services has been reflected in FCC
policies and orders since the WTO negotiations on basic
telecommunications concluded in 1997.
